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Abstract
This paper provides an introduction to modelling the choice of lin-
ear income tax rate in both majority voting and social welfare max-
imising contexts. Although the basic problem in each case — of ﬁnding
the most preferred tax for the median voter and the welfare maximis-
ing tax for an independent judge or decision-maker — can be simply
stated, it is usually not possible to obtain explicit solutions even for
simple assumptions about preferences and population heterogeneity.
The present paper instead gives special attention to a formulation of
the required conditions in terms of easily interpreted magnitudes, the
elasticity of average earnings with respect to the tax rate and a mea-
sure of inequality. The inequality measure takes the same basic form
in each model (depending either on median earnings or a weighted
average of earnings, where the weights depend on value judgements
regarding inequality aversion. The approach enables the comparative
static eﬀects of a range of parameter changes to be considered. The
results are reinforced using numerical examples based on the constant
elasticity of substitution utility function.
∗Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Aus-
tralia.
11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction to some of the prob-
lems involved in modelling the choice of tax rate in simple tax and transfer
systems. The subject may be divided into two broad strands, positive and
n o r m a t i v ei nn a t u r e .T h ep o s i t i v el i n ea t t e m p t st om o d e lp o l i c yc h o i c e sa n d
to investigate to what extent they can be explained as the outcome of vot-
ing behaviour. It combines modelling and empirical work. The normative
line investigates the policy implications of adopting alternative value judge-
ments. It typically uses modelling methods to examine choices implied by the
maximisation of a social welfare function representing the views of a single
decision-maker.1
Special attention is given below to the simplest possible progressive tax
structure, one having an unconditional transfer payment (or ‘basic income’)
and a proportional income tax (or ‘ﬂat tax’).2 The combined eﬀect is to
generate an increasing average tax rate over the whole range of income and
therefore a high degree of progressivity, even though the system has a con-
stant marginal tax rate (and thus a non-progressive rate scale). This system
may be administered in several ways (depending for example on whether in-
dividuals simultaneously pay tax and receive a beneﬁt, or whether the net
tax, which may be positive or negative, is assessed for each person), giving
rise to diﬀerent descriptions. But the terms ‘linear income tax’ or ‘BI/FT’
seem to be the least ambiguous.
The linear tax involves just two tax policy parameters, the basic income
and the tax rate. However, the government faces a budget constraint whereby
the tax raised must be suﬃcient to ﬁnance the transfer payment and any other
non-transfer expenditure. Hence, it is possible to choose the level of only one
parameter independently. Having selected the tax rate, a value of the basic
income is implied. This structure therefore appears to oﬀer a very simple
1It is often suggested that determination of the optimal tax is an exercise in ‘second
best’ policy, since a ﬁrst-best tax is one imposed on the unobservable basic endowment of
ability.
2The following discussion considers income units for which income is the only tax-
relevant variable, so that no transfers for ‘special needs’ arise and income unit size and
composition are irrelevant.
2policy choice: only the single income tax rate needs to be set, assuming that
the non-transfer expenditure needs have already been decided.
If individuals’ labour supplies, and hence their incomes, are ﬁxed inde-
pendently of the tax system, consideration of this choice is also simple. For
example, complete equality could be achieved by setting a tax rate of 1 and
sharing all the revenue equally, after covering non-transfer needs.3 If the tax
were to be decided democratically using majority voting, the relatively rich
would vote for the minimum tax consistent with raising non-transfer expen-
diture while the poor would vote for the maximum feasible tax rate of 1. But
of course in practice labour supply incentives are important: they impose se-
vere restrictions on the ability of governments to redistribute income. The
question then arises of what insights can be obtained about the choice of tax
rate, given explicit statements about the decision-making process and infor-
mation about individuals’ preferences and their productivities. As mentioned
earlier, the decision may for example be made as a result of a democratic
vote, or it may be imposed by a government (seen as a single decision-maker)
holding a particular set of value judgements. The power to tax — to impose
a non-voluntary imposition — is seen as a fundamental characteristic of gov-
ernments.
It is simple to describe in principle the mechanics of modelling tax choices
in the context of the linear income tax where just one policy dimension is
involved and heterogeneity only of abilities, and thus wage rates, is assumed
to exist. The indirect utility function of each individual is obtained (by
substituting optimal values into the direct utility function) and by using the
government’s budget constraint (relating the basic income to the tax rate)
these are expressed in terms of the tax rate only (along with preference
parameters of course). Using the median voter theorem, the majority voting
equilibrium is found by maximing the median voter’s indirect utility with
respect to the tax rate. To examine optimal policies the indirect utilities are
substituted into a social welfare function, which is maximised with respect
to the tax rate. Both are in principle unconstrained maximisation problems
3This assumes that the rich cannot vote for a poll tax (a negative basic income) to
ﬁnance non-transfer expenditure.
3involving one variable. However, the resulting ﬁrst-order condition usually
turns out to be highly nonlinear. It is very diﬃcult to produce analytical
solutions, even with extremely simple models.4 The technical literature is
therefore extensive and usually involves the use of numerical solution methods
to examine a range of assumptions.
Conceptually, the problem can also be stated simply in terms of the tan-
gency of indiﬀerence curves (either of the median voter or the social decision
maker) with a government budget constraint. But it is diﬃcult to take such
purely diagrammatic insights much further. Nevertheless some useful in-
sights can be obtained for the linear tax structure using some basic algebra
and related diagrams, as shown below. It is possible to highlight the kind
of information which would be required to determine the tax rate — either
in positive or normative contexts — and about the potential limits to redis-
tribution imposed by the existence of incentive eﬀects. The emphasis here
is on two summary measures, those of earnings inequality and the elastic-
ity of average earnings with respect to the tax rate. The properties of tax
choices expressed in terms of these concepts can guide intuition regarding
comparative static parameter changes.
Section 2 begins by describing the linear tax structure and examining
the form of the government’s budget constraint. Individuals’ preferences
regarding the choice of tax rate, subject to that constraint, are considered
in Section 3. Majority voting outcomes and optimal tax decisions are then
examined in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. Some general properties of tax
structures are then discussed brieﬂy in Section 6.
4Hence numerical simulation methods are generally needed to examine particular model
assumption. Special cases of utility functions giving rise to closed-form solutions for the
optimal tax rate are given in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, pp. 408-9). Hindriks and Myles
(2006, pp. 503-505, pp. 493-495) discuss a special case of majority voting, and two-person
examples of the optimal tax rate structure. A further explicit solution to an optimal tax
problem, assuming that income supply functions are linear in the wage rate, is given by
Deaton (1983).
42T h e T a x S y s t e m
This section describes the simple linear tax model and considers the resulting
constraints faced by individuals and the government.
2.1 Individuals
Suppose earnings from employment, yi, for i =1 ,...,n individuals, are the
only form of income, other than transfer payments. The linear income tax
involves a ﬂat-rate tax at the rate, t, along with an unconditional (non means-
tested) transfer payment of b per person. Hence the tax paid, T (yi),i s :
T (yi)=tyi − b (1)
and net income, zi,i s :
zi =( 1− t)yi + b (2)
If t>0 and b>0 the tax is progressive.5 The progressive nature of this type
of structure can be seen from Figure 1, which shows an increasing average























Figure 1: Average and Marginal Tax Rates in the Linear Income Tax Struc-
ture
5However, if b<0 the transfer payment is instead a poll tax. This arises if the tax rate
is not high enough to ﬁnance non-transfer expenditure.
52.2 The Government’s Budget Constraint
In addition to ﬁnancing transfer payments from the income tax, suppose the
government needs to collects net revenue of R per person. In the following
analysis it is assumed that any expenditure arising from this revenue does
not aﬀect individuals’ utilities.6 The government therefore faces a budget
constraint of the form nR + nb = t
Pn
i=1 yi,o r :
R = ty − b (3)
Here y is arithmetic mean gross earnings, which depends on all the tax para-
meters as well as the distribution of wage rates and individuals’ preferences.
Holding R constant means that there is only one degree of freedom in the
choice of t and b. The general form of the government’s budget constraint,
for ﬁxed R,i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 .W h e nt =0 , b = −R.S ol o n ga st h et a x











Figure 2: The Government Budget Constraint
The slope of the budget line, giving the variation in b as t varies, keeping
R ﬁxed, can be obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the budget constraint in
6The basic model can be extended to allow for the non-transfer expenditure to be used
to ﬁnance public goods, introducing further modelling complexities.




























The variation in average gross earnings as tax parameters vary can be























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
R
(7)
This result could easily be converted into an expression involving elasticities.
Hence the elasticity of ¯ y with respect to t depends on the partial elasticities
of ¯ y with respect to t and b, along with the elasticity of b with respect to t
along the government budget constraint.
3 Individual Behaviour
The aim of this section is to characterise an individual’s preferred position on
the government’s budget constraint relating b and t. First, individual utility
maximisation involving consumption and labour supply choices is considered
in order to generate the indirect utility function expressed in terms of the tax
parameters. Then the tax preferences of individuals are examined, depending
on their earnings. The results are entirely general in that they do not depend
on the form of utility functions or the distribution of wage rates.
3.1 Utility Maximisation
Let ci and  i denote the consumption and labour supply of individual i,w h o
faces a pre-tax wage rate of wi,f o ri =1 ,...,n. Gross earnings are thus
yi = wi i. The price of consumption is normalised to 1 and as the model is
7static, so that no savings are made, consumption and net income are equal;
hence ci = zi.
Each individual maximises U (ci,  i) subject to the budget constraint:
ci =( 1− t)yi + b (8)
Suppose also that each individual is endowed with one unit of time, which
may be divided between leisure and work. The eﬀective price of leisure is
the net wage. Full income, Mi,d e ﬁned as the maximum income which can
be obtained by devoting all available time to working, is thus:7
Mi = wi (1 − t)+b (9)
Substituting the optimal values in the direct utility function gives the indirect
utility function in terms of the net wage and full income, V (wi (1 − t),M i):
for present purposes this can be written more succinctly as V (t,b).
3.2 Individual Tax Preferences
Consider each individual’s preferences over the tax rate rate. Non-transfer
expenditure is assumed to be set exogenously, so the govenment’s budget
constraint implies a value of b for any t. Hence only the latter can be se-
lected independently.8 Diagrammatically, each individual’s indirect utility
function V (t,b) deﬁnes a set of indiﬀerence curves in Figure 2. If the indi-
vidual works, an increase in t must be compensated by an increase in the
basic income, b,s oi n d i ﬀerence curves are upward sloping from left to right.
An individual’s preferred position on the government budget constraint is
therefore characterised by a tangency between an indiﬀerence curve and the
constraint. The slope of the budget constraint is given in equation (5). The
slope of indiﬀerence curves is given in the usual way, by setting the total








7The usual approach thus considers each individual as eﬀectively obtaining full income
and then purchasing consumption and leisure at prices 1 and wi (1 − t) respectively.
8The choice must be over the tax rate, because there are two values of t corresponding
to any given b, whereas choice of t g i v e sr i s et oau n i q u eb.
8and when dV =0 :
db
dt






At this point, it is useful to employ a standard result from duality theory.
In general for an indirect utlity function of the form V (p,m), for goods
demanded, xi, at prices, pi, and a budget of m, Roy’s Identity gives the
Marshallian demands as xi = −(∂V/dpi)/(∂V/dm). In the present context,
this means that labour supply,  i, can be expressed as:
 i =








In the ﬁrst line of this expression, the minus sign in the standard form of
Roy’s Identity has been deleted because the variable in question is the amount





It should of course be remembered that yi is not ﬁxed, but depends on the
nature of preferences as well as the tax parameters. In (13), ∂V/∂t < 0
and ∂V/∂b > 0, so that the right hand side is positive. Combining (13) and
(11), the slope of an individual’s indiﬀerence curve, relating to preferences
regarding b and t,a ta n yp o i n ti st h u s : 10
db
dt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
V
= yi (14)
At the tangency position, equating the slope of the indiﬀerence curve




9This insight is found in Tuomala (1985).
10This may be compared with the simple case where there are no labour supply incentive
eﬀects. In the ﬁxed income case, individual net income, zi,i sg i v e nb yzi =( 1− t)yi + b.
The individual is thus treated as selecting the tax structure which maximises net income.




Furthermore, the government’s budget constraint is a straight line with a slope equal to
the (ﬁxed) mean income of ¯ y. Hence, as discussed in the introduction, all those with yi < ¯ y
prefer the maximum tax rate of unity.
9is equated to db
dt
¯ ¯
V = yi from (14). The individual’s preferred combination of









which can be rearranged to produce the following form:









Using equation (7),11 t h et e r mi nb r a c k e t so nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 1 6 )




R,s ot h a t :
yi − y = t
dy
dt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
R
(17)
















¯ ¯ represents the absolute value of the elasticity of average earn-
ings with respect to the tax rate. This equality characterises individual i’s
preferred tax rate.
However, the expression in (18) applies only to individuals for whom yi <
¯ y, for which tangency solutions on the government’s budget constraint apply.
An individual with yi > ¯ y has indiﬀerence curves (relating b and t)w i t ha
slope, yi, that exceeds the slope of the government’s budget constraints.
Hence the optimal position for such an individual is a corner solution at
t = tmin.12
4 Majority Choice of Tax Rate
Having considered individuals’ preferred tax rates, in terms of their pre-
ferred position on the government’s budget line, this section examines ma-
jority voting over the tax rate. The context is therefore one of voting over







12A regressive poll tax is ruled out by assumption.
10a single-dimensional issue: voting simultaneously over more than one issue
raises further complexities not examined here.13 First, it is necessary to es-
tablish a feature of the model whereby individuals can be ranked in ascending
order by their gross incomes in precisely the same way, independently of the
tax rate. The majority outcome, corresponding to the preferences of the me-
dian voter, is then examined. Numerical examples are used to demonstrate
comparative static properties of the result.
4.1 Individual Ranks
An important property of the present model is that the ranking of individuals
by their gross earnings, which (as shown in the previous section) determines
their preferred position on the government’s budget constraint, and thus
choice of tax rate, is not aﬀected by the tax parameters. This condition of











Figure 3: Hierarchical Adherence with Single Crossing Indiﬀerence Curves
This property is guaranteed if a ‘single crossing’ condition applies to indi-
viduals’ indiﬀerence curves deﬁned in terms of gross and net income.14 This
13On diﬃculties raised by multidimentional voting, see Muller (2003, pp. 87-92).
14See Ganns and Smart (1996).
11is illustrated in Figure 3, which has gross earnings on the horizontal axis and
net income on the vertical axis. The tax function, with a slope of 1 − t,i s
shown as a straight line and the preferred position of person 1 is shown as
the tangency of indiﬀerence curve w1 with the tax function. This determines
labour supply (and hence gross earnings) and consumption (net income). An
individual with a higher wage, w2, must have an indiﬀerence curve that is
ﬂatter than than associated with w1 (at the tangency position) because any
given increase in gross earnings can be obtained by working a smaller num-
ber of extra hours. Hence a given increase in gross earnings (a reduction in
leisure) does not need to be compensated by as high an increase in net in-
come as for the person with the lower wage rate. The person with the higher
wage rate therefore reaches a tangency to the right of that of the person with
the lower wage. This must apply for all linear tax functions, whatever their
slope. Those with relatively high w necessarily have relatively high y.
4.2 The Median Voter
Consider the majority choice of the tax rate, for given R.I ti sw e l lk n o w n
that single-peaked preferences guarantee a voting equilibrium in which the
median voter dominates. The median voter unambiguously holds the bal-
ance of power, and coalitions would not be formed between those on either
side of the median. In the present framework, single-peakedness arises if
the relationship between V and t is concave, so that d2V/dt2 > 0.W i t h
positive marginal utility and a concave relationship between b and t,s i n g l e -
peakedness is guaranteed if the individual always works, that is if wi exceeds
the minimum wage, wL, necessary to avoid the corner solution where  i =0 .
Hence if all wi >w L, combined with the fact that the ranks of individuals
are independent of the tax system, the median voter can unambiguously be
identiﬁed with the median wage, wm, and hence the median earnings, ym.
If there are individuals who do not work, that is if wi <w L for some i,
their preferences are not single peaked. Remembering that wL depends on
the tax rate, such an individual may work when t is very low and suﬀer from
increases in t. However, once the tax rate is suﬃciently high for them to stop
12working altogether, they prefer t to rise further because they desire only the
highest possible transfer payment and are not themselves directly aﬀected
by further increases in t. Roberts (1977) showed that there is nevertheless
a majority voting equilibrium, so long as the ranking of individuals are in-
dependent of the tax system. This condition has already been established
above.15
Having demonstrated that the median voter theorem applies in this case,
it can be seen from (18) that substitution of ym for yi shows that the majority







The left hand side of this expression can be interpreted as a measure of the
inequality of earnings: it is the proportional diﬀerence between the median
and the arithmetic mean gross earnings.16 While this condition is simply
stated and has terms with convenient interpretations, it does not of course
provide a ‘closed form’ solution for the majority choice of tax rate. The
simplicity of this condition disguises considerable complexity, since ¯ y and ηy,t
d e p e n do nt h ec o m p l e t ew a g er a t ed i s t r i b u t i o na n dt h et a xp a r a m e t e r s . 17
4.3 Illustrative Examples
It is useful to consider how the terms in (19) are likely to vary with t.T h i s
can be achieved using numerical examples based on speciﬁc assumptions
regarding the wage rate distribution and utility functions. Suppose that
individuals have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions,




−ρ +( 1− α)(1−  )
−ρª−1/ρ
(20)
15The existence of a majority voting equilibrium in the case of a tax-free threshold is
demonstrated by Creedy and Francois (1993), who also show that in a multi-period context
hierachical adherence is not suﬃcient to guarantee an equilibrium.
16It is assumed that the wage rate distribution is positively skewed, so that the median
wage is less than the arithmetic mean.
17Furthermore, an attempt to solve for the choice of t analytically would proceed directly
from the ﬁrst-order condition. An example using Cobb-Douglas utility functions is given
the Appendix.
13where the endowment of time is normalised to unity, so that 1−  is leisure,










It can be shown that interior solutions for labour supply and consumption
are:









Where, as above, M is full income given by wi (1 − t)+b.E q u a t i o n ( 2 2 )
applies only for wage rates in excess of a minimum, wL, for which   =1 .
Suppose that wage rates are lognormally distributed as Λ(w|μ,σ2).As i m u -
lated population of individuals’ wages can therefore be obtained by selecting
random values from this lognormal distribution. For given preference para-
meters (common to all individuals) it is possible to ﬁnd the value of b which
satisﬁes the government’s budget constraint, for given values of t and R,
using a process of trial and error.19
Figure 4 shows the variation in arithmetic mean gross income, ¯ y,w i t ht h e
marginal tax rate, t,f o rt h r e ed i ﬀerent values of non-transfer expenditure, R.
These results are for a wage rate distribution, Λ(w|10,0.5), and α =0 .98
with θ =0 .7.20 Clearly, average income decreases as the tax rate increases.
The proﬁle for the smaller level of non-transfer expenditure is higher because,
for a given tax rate, the transfer payment must be smaller so that labour
supply is higher. The corresponding government budget constraints showing






19This involves using a trial value of b and solving each individual’s labour supply
decision. The resulting total values of tax revenue and expenditure can be checked. If
revenue exceeds expenditure, the value of b is increased and the process is repeated until
convergence is reached. For further discussion of such iterative methods, see Creedy (1996).
20On the choice of parameter values in the CES case, see Creedy (1996, pp. 136-139).




































































Figure 4: Mean Earnings
the variation in b as t increases are shown in Figure 5, again for three values
of non-transfer expenditure. When the tax rate increases from low levels, the
‘tax rate eﬀect’ on total revenue, and hence b, is greater than the ‘tax base
eﬀect’ arising from the adverse incentive eﬀects. However, after a certain
point the reduction in the tax base outweighs the eﬀect of the increasing tax
rate, and the tranfer payment falls as t rises.




¯ ¯,f o rt h et h r e eR values, are illustrated in
Figure 6 for variations in the tax rate, t.B o t hp r o ﬁles are upward sloping as
both the absolute elasticity of ¯ y with respect to t, and the inequality of gross
earnings, in this case expressed in the form, 1−
ym
y , rise with t.H o w e v e r ,t h e
(absolute) elasticity rises faster than inequality and there is consequently a
single equilibrium position. The majority choice of tax rate can thus be read
from the appropriate point of intersection of the two proﬁles. Increasing R
shifts the proﬁle of 1 −
ym
y and that of
¯ ¯ηy,t
¯ ¯ downwards. In the examples
shown here, the shift in the latter proﬁle is relatively larger. Hence the
m e d i a nv o t e r ’ sc h o i c eo ft increases.













































































Figure 5: Government Budget Constraint














Figure 6: Median Voter Outcomes
16assumed value of the variance of logarithms of w. A higher variance implies a
lower value of wm/¯ w and thus of ym/¯ y, for any given tax rate.21 An increase
in wage rate inequality resulting from an increase in σ2 has the eﬀect of
shifting the proﬁle of
¯ ¯ηy,t
¯ ¯ downwards slightly. That is, it produces a small
reduction in the absolute elasticity for any given tax rate. However, it clearly
produces an upward shift in the proﬁle of 1−
ym
y ,s i n c eym/¯ y is lower for any
given tax rate. Both of these eﬀects imply an unequivocal increase in the
majority voting equilibrium tax rate. The increase is smaller, the smaller
is the eﬀect on
¯ ¯ηy,t
¯ ¯. This suggests that higher inequality (associated with
the higher skewness of the distribution of earnings) produces a majority vote
for a higher tax rate, and thus a more redistributive (and progressive) tax
structure.22
5O p t i m a l T a x a t i o n
This section turns to the normative analysis of tax rate choices, where em-
p h a s i si so ne x a m i n a t i o no ft h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fa d o p t i n gp a r t i c u l a rv a l u e
judgements, summarised by a social welfare function. It is shown in subsec-
tion 5.1 that the condition satisﬁed by the optimal linear tax is very similar
to that obtained for the majority voting outcome. The diﬀerence is that the




¯ ¯ is replaced by one
in which the median voter’s earnings are replaced by a weighted average of
earnings. Illustrative examples are then presented in subsection 5.2.
5.1 A Social Welfare Function
Suppose the aim of the government is to maximise a social welfare function of
the form W = W (V1,...,Vn). This function of individual (indirect) utilities
can be regarded, since each Vi depends on the tax parameters, as a function
21It can be shown that in a lognormal distribution with variance of logarithms equal to





22Empirical studies of the relationship between inequality and redistributive taxation
have found mixed results; see, for example, Borck (2007). This simple majority voting
model abstracts from numerous practical factors (the role of parties, political inﬂuence,
voter participation, uncertainty and so on) as well as dynamic considerations.
17of t and b. It therefore gives a set of ‘social indiﬀerence curves’ in Figure 2.
The choice of optimal tax rate is thus represented as a tangency of a social
indiﬀerence curve with the government budget constraint.23 The slope of an
indiﬀerence curve is given by:
db
dt































∂b = vi is the ‘welfare weight’ attached by the social welfare
function to an addition to person i’s income (from an increase in the basic




































The right hand side of this expression is a weighted average of the yis, which
can be denoted e y. Hence equating the slopes of the social indiﬀerence curve









23An alternative route to the following result, followed by Tuamala (1985) involves using
the Lagrangian, L = W+λ(ty − b − R).T h eﬁrst-order conditions for maximisation, ∂L
∂t =
0 and ∂L

























. Dividing these two conditions therefore
reproduces the result below.
18The optimal tax rate therefore satisﬁe st h es a m ek i n do fc o n d i t i o na st h e







T h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h i se x p r e s s i o n ,a sw i t h( 1 9 ) ,d e ﬁnes an inequality
measure, this time involving the proportional diﬀerence between the weighted
average earnings and the unweighted average earnings, where the weights
depend on the form of the social welfare function. The optimal tax is that
rate which satisﬁes equation (30).24
Since the majority choice and the social welfare function maxima are
both described in terms of tangency solutions of a form of indiﬀerence curve
along the government’s budget constraint, it is perhaps not surprising that
they can be expressed in fundamentally the same way. The only diﬀerence
relates to the inequality measure used. Hence, if in general a measure of the
inequality of earnings, taking the form of a proportional diﬀerence between
average earnings and some other measure of location, is denoted by I (y),t h e




Again, this does not provide a closed-form solution, and of course any solution
must also satisfy t>t min if the tax system is to be progressive. That is, if the
tax does not raise suﬃcient revenue to ﬁnance the non-transfer expenditure,
R, the shortfall must be made up by imposing a poll tax (a negative b)o n
each individual. But, as with majority voting, the expression in (30) provides
a condition in terms of easily interpreted concepts.
5.2 Illustrative Examples
In section 4.2, proﬁles of
¯ ¯ηy,t
¯ ¯ were shown, on the assumption that utility
functions display constant elasticity of substitution. Examination of optimal
24This is the result given by Tuomala (1985). However, in the accompanying diagram,
he draws a downward sloping curve of 1 −
h y
y against t. I ti ss h o w nb e l o wt h a tb o t ht h e
right and left hand sides of (30) slope upwards.
19tax choices therefore requires corresponding values of the inequality measure,
I (y)=1 −
h y
y to be produced, where ˜ y depends on the welfare weights,
vi. Although it is possible to examine the implications of using any type
of social welfare function, a convenient approach for present purposes is to
specify welfare in terms of each individual’s income, rather than utility.25
Using a constant relative inequality aversion form of the welfare function, the
contribution to social welfare of the ith individual is y
1−ε
i /(1 − ε), where ε is
the constant relative inequality aversion coeﬃcient. The term ˜ y can thus be
replaced by the equally distributed equivalent level of income, ye,d e ﬁned as
the level of income which, if obtained by everyone, produces the same social
welfare as the actual distribution. Hence, the term I (y) can be replaced
by Atkinson’s inequality measure, A, since it is the proportional diﬀerence


















Figure 7 illustrates the variation in the inequality of net income and gross
earnings as the tax rate increases, for a given value of ε =0 .2. Inequality
of gross earnings increase as t rises, whereas the inequality of net income
falls steadily. The relatively small decrease in the inequality of net income
over a wide range of t indicates the severe constraint on the government’s
ability to redistribute income imposed by adverse incentive eﬀects. Figure 8
illustrates the relevant proﬁles for R =1 0 0 0and ε =0 .8, for two values of
t h ev a r i a n c eo fl o g a r i t h m so fw a g er a t e s .I nt h i sc a s et h ep r o ﬁle of
¯ ¯ηy,t
¯ ¯ is
virtually unchanged, so the upward movement in the inequality proﬁle clearly
produces a higher choice of optimal tax rate. Hence, higher inequality is again
associated with a more redistributive tax structure. Similarly, a higher value
of the inequality aversion coeﬃcient shifts only the proﬁle of 1−˜ y/¯ y upwards,
implying a higher optimal tax rate.





















Figure 7: Inequality of Net Income and Gross Earnings
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Figure 8: Change in Inequality of Wages
21The eﬀect of diﬀerences in the elasticity of substitution are less clear cut
in this framework because it depends on the non-transfer revenue needed. If
there is a pure transfers system, with R =0 , the optimal tax rate falls as the
elasticity of substitution increases. However, if R>0 the optimal rate falls
as the elasticity of substitution, θ, increases from low values. But at higher
values of θ, further increases actually lead to an increase in the optimal tax
rate. This arises because the minimum tax rate needed to ﬁnance the non-
transfer expendure is higher for higher values of θ.
6 Optimal Tax Structures
The above analysis has concentrated on the choice of tax rate in the simplest
possible redistributive tax and transfer system, the linear income tax. A
more general, and much more diﬃcult, question concerns the nature of the
optimal tax structure itself.26 It is not clear that a linear structure, involving
a constant marginal tax rate, is optimal, and it is likely that the optimal
structure depends on the nature of the social welfare function examined as
well as the wage rate distribution and the preference parameters. However,
emphasis on the linear tax arises not only because of its simplicity, but also
because numerical analyses have suggested that, for a range of assumptions,
the optimal structure is approximately linear.
The general treatment of optimal tax structures yields few clear results,
yet perhaps ironically the most unambiguous results can easily be established
diagrammatically. First consider Figure 9 which shows a tax function in a
diagram with net income on the vertical and gross income on the horizontal
axis. This displays a range AB where the marginal tax rate (equal to 1
minus the slope of the tax schedule) is greater than 100 per cent. It is clear
that this range is irrelevant, since indiﬀerence curves relating net income and
gross earnings are upward sloping and convex: an increase in gross earnings
involves an increase in hours worked, which must be compensated by an
increase in net income (consumption). An example of a preferred position,
















Figure 9: Maximum Tax Rate
for a particular wage rate, is shown as the tangency between the tax function
and the indiﬀerence curve. Hence AB can be replaced by a marginal tax rate
of unity, showing that the maximum rate is 1.
There is a further result which is perhaps surprising and which states
that the marginal tax rate on the highest income should be zero. In Figure
10 consider the tax function AB, where the person with the highest wage
rate reaches a tangency position at C. If the tax function is changed to ACD,
where CD is parallel to the 45 degree line, the individual then faces a zero
marginal rate on any extra income earned. This induces a movement to a new
tangency on a higher indiﬀerence curve. The total tax revenue is unchanged
and no one else is aﬀected: hence there is a Pareto improvement and the
non-zero top marginal rate cannot have been optimal. However, this result
is of no practical relevance as there is no way to determine just where the
rate should become zero.
Instead of considering the optimal form of the tax function in general,
one approach has been to consider piecewise-linear tax functions. This allow



















Figure 10: Tax Rate on Top Income
higher for those with relatively low earnings. Such higher marginal rates arise
from the means-testing of transfer payments, whereby beneﬁts are reduced as
earnings rise. The resulting non-convexity of budget sets facing individuals
can give rise to complex labour supply behaviour. Means-testing is preferred
by those who advocate ‘target eﬃciency’ as the criterion by which schemes
should be judged. However, numerical analyses show that in a very wide
range of situations, a social welfare function is increased by a shift towards
a ﬂatter rate schedule.27
7 Conclusions
This paper has considered the choice of linear income tax rate in both ma-
jority voting and social welfare maximising contexts. Although the basic
problem in each case — of ﬁnding the most preferred tax for the median voter
and the welfare maximising tax for an independent judge or decision-maker
27See, for examples, simulation results reported in Creedy (1998). However, assumptions
leading to relatively higher taxes on the poor and the rich are given by Diamond (1998).
See also Atkinson (1995).
24— can be simply stated, it is usually not possible to obtain explicit solutions
even for simple assumptions about preferences and population heterogeneity.
The present paper has instead given special attention to a formulation of the
required conditions in terms of easily interpreted magnitudes, the elasticity
of average earnings with respect to the tax rate and a measure of inequality.
The inequality measure takes the same basic form in each model. It is either
the proportional diﬀerence between the median and arithmetic mean earnings
(in the voting model) or the proportional diﬀerence between a weighted av-
erage of earnings and arithmetic mean earnings (for maximisation of a social
welfare function), where the weights depend on value judgements regarding
inequality aversion. The approach enables the comparative static eﬀects of
a range of parameter changes to be considered. The results were reinforced
using numerical examples based on the constant elasticity of substitution
utility function.
25Appendix: Majority Voting with Cobb-Douglas
Preferences
Consider the case where all utility functions take the Cobb-Douglas form
(omitting subscript i), U = cαh1−α,w h e r e  =1−h, so that with full income
of M = w(1 − t)+b, the demands are c = αM and h =( 1− α)M/{w(1 − t)}.
Earnings are thus equal to y = αw −(1 − α)b/(1 − t), and if all individuals
work, arithmetic mean earnings are therefore:




and using the government budget constraint, b = t¯ y−R, the transfer payment
can be expressed as:
b =






Substituting c, h into U and using (2), indirect utility can be written, using













αt − R/¯ w
1 − αt
¾¸
= w(1 − t)A (4)
where A denote the term in square brackets in the preceding expression.
Then V = k{w(1 − t)}
α A a n dw h e r et h em e d i a nw a g ei swm,t h em a j o r i t y
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2 (5)
Rearrangement of (5) gives the majority choice as the appropriate root of
the following quadratic:
at
2 + bt + c =0 (6)














26Hence even in what might appear to be a very simple model, no convenient
expression for the majority choice of tax rate is available, although numerical
examples can easily be obtained using these results.
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